Many firms that take restructuring charges reverse a portion of those restructuring charge accruals in a later quarter. These reversals increase net income, often substantially. In this study, I investigate whether restructuring charge reversals are associated with incentives to meet or exceed analysts' forecasts, avoid earnings declines relative to prior-year levels, and avoid losses. I examine both the decision to record a reversal and the amount of the reversal, using a sample of 121 reversals recorded between 1990 and 1999. The results suggest that some firms record reversals to beat analysts' forecasts and to avoid reporting net losses. There is also some evidence that firms record reversals to avoid earnings declines. Overall, the results are consistent with firms using restructuring accrual reversals to manage earnings.
INTRODUCTION
argue that academics are "unwilling to believe that earnings management is practiced by most firms or that the earnings management that does exist should necessarily concern investors" (235). In contrast, practitioners and regulators "often see earnings management as pervasive and problematic -and in need of immediate remedial action" (Dechow and Skinner 2000, 235) . For example, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Chairman Arthur Levitt has expressed concern that earnings management is causing "an erosion in the quality of earnings, and therefore, the quality of financial reporting" (Levitt 1998).
Levitt cites restructuring charges as one means managers can use to manage earnings.
Restructuring charges represent the current period recognition of the estimated amount of current and future costs associated with restructuring activities (e.g., work-force reductions, the redesign of unprofitable operations, etc.). These charges can be substantial. For example, Dechow et al. (1994) find that restructuring charges average 80 percent of net income before the charge.
Walter Schuetz, the Chief Accountant in the SEC's Division of Enforcement, indicated that his staff is observing an increasing propensity for firms to reverse portions of their earlier restructuring charges (Schuetz 1998) . In contrast to the initial charges, these reversals increase net income. For example, Lucent Technologies reversed $409 million from restructuring reserves back to income from 1997 to 1999.
In this study, I investigate whether firms use restructuring charge reversals to manage earnings to meet earnings benchmarks. Reversals of these restructuring accruals are observable, explicit transactions that unambiguously increase net income. Examining restructuring charge reversals permits a direct test of potential earnings management based on an observable transaction, rather than on noisy estimates of unobservable earnings management mechanisms such as discretionary accruals. 1 
I investigate a sample of 121 reversals recorded between 1990
and 1999 to test whether managers appear to use restructuring charge reversals to avoid missing analysts' forecasts, to avoid earnings declines, and/or to avoid net losses.
I find that managers are more likely to reverse restructuring charges when pre-reversal earnings fall short of analysts' forecasts or when pre-reversal net income is negative. Also, I find some evidence that managers are more likely to reverse restructuring accruals when pre-reversal net income declined from the previous year. Furthermore, the amount of the reversal increases in the magnitude of the pre-reversal shortfall from analysts' forecasts and the magnitude of prereversal losses.
These results are consistent with analysts', auditors', and regulatory authorities' concerns that some firms use restructuring charge reversals to manage earnings. In particular, the results are consistent with recent evidence suggesting that firms manage earnings to avoid "bad news" earnings surprises and net losses (e.g., Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge, et al. 1999; and Burgstahler and Eames 2001) . Libby and Kinney (2000, 384) note that although past research suggests that firms manage earnings to meet targets such as forecasts, there is little evidence regarding firms' use of particular methods to meet the benchmarks. This study provides evidence suggesting that managers use a specific accrual, reversals of restructuring charges, to achieve earnings benchmarks.
The remaining sections of this paper are organized as follows. Section II overviews restructuring charges and describes managers' incentives and opportunities to use restructuring charges to manage earnings. Section III develops the hypotheses, Section IV describes the research design, and Section V presents the results. Section VI summarizes the study.
II. MANAGERS' INCENTIVES TO USE RESTRUCTURING CHARGES AND REVERSALS TO MANAGE EARNINGS
Restructuring-related liabilities and expenses include costs incurred for: (1) employee benefits such as severance and termination benefits; (2) elimination and reduction of product lines; (3) consolidation or relocation of plant facilities; (4) new systems development or acquisition; and (5) retraining employees to use newly developed systems. The charge may also include losses from asset impairments and disposals of assets (Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF) 1994).
The decision to restructure is part of the firm's overall investment strategy. However, managers can exercise discretion over the amount and timing of the restructuring charge (and of any subsequent reversal) despite additional guidance from the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and its EITF on accounting for restructuring activities.
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The types of costs included in restructuring charges are sometimes ambiguous, and restructuring charges usually include estimates of future costs. These uncertainties mean that managers can use their discretion to overstate the current-period charge to create a hidden balance sheet reserve that will increase future earnings.
There are several reasons why managers might use the restructuring charge to manage earnings. First, firms can increase future earnings by recognizing the restructuring charge as part of a "big bath" (Elliott and Hanna 1996) , and there is evidence that firms record restructuring charges in years when pre-charge accounting earnings are low (e.g., Brickley and Van Drunen 1990; John et al. 1992) . Managers may accelerate future costs into restructuring charges (Gill et al. 1996) because analysts usually treat these charges as nonrecurring (Smith and Lipin 1996) .
Firms can then use the reserve created by these accelerated costs to increase future earnings.
Warren Buffett (1999, 15) argues that the size and timing of restructuring charges are "dictated by the cynical proposition that Wall Street will not mind if earnings fall short by $5 per share in a given quarter, just as long as this deficiency ensures that quarterly earnings in the future will consistently exceed expectations by five cents per share."
Second, prior research suggests that capital markets react positively, on average, to restructuring activities. Brickley and Van Drunen (1990) and Kross et al. (1996) found that despite the large reduction in accounting earnings and book value from substantial restructuring charges, announcements of restructuring activities and related charges result, on average, in positive two-day abnormal returns of roughly 1 percent. Their evidence is consistent with the view of Robert S. Miller, Chairman of Waste Management, Inc., that "somebody woke up to the fact that if you take something as a restructuring charge, investors will forgive you immediately" (Byrnes and Melcher 1998, 134) .
Third, prior research suggests that firms do not penalize managers for recording restructuring charges. Dechow et al. (1994) find that CEO compensation does not decrease in response to restructuring charges, on average. Gaver and Gaver (1998) also find that executive compensation is largely shielded from the effects of nonrecurring income-decreasing items.
Furthermore, John et al. (1992) 
III. HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT

Incentives to Meet Analysts' Forecasts and to Avoid Earnings Decreases and Losses
Evidence in earlier studies suggests that managers manage earnings: (1) (Burgstahler 1997; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997; Degeorge et al. 1999 ).
Brown (2001) finds that over the period 1984 to 1999, the median firm's earnings went from barely missing analysts' estimates per I/B/E/S, to meeting estimates, and then to beating estimates. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997, 101) estimate that "8-12% of firms with small premanaged earnings declines manipulate earnings to achieve earnings increases, and 30-44% of firms with small pre-managed losses manage earnings to create positive earnings," and conclude that avoiding earnings decreases and net losses is a "pervasive phenomenon."
Recent research suggests that the market appears to reward firms that meet or beat earnings targets. Barth et al. (1999) find a price-earnings multiple premium for firms that report consistently increasing earnings and a disproportionately large stock price decrease when the increasing earnings pattern is broken. This is consistent with DeAngelo et al. (1996) , who find negative abnormal stock returns averaging 14% in the year that an earnings growth pattern is broken. Matsunaga and Park (2001) find that managers also have compensation-based incentives to meet analysts' forecasts and to avoid earnings declines. Specifically, they find that CEO compensation drops beyond the normal penalty for poor performance when the firm misses analysts' forecasts and/or reports earnings decreases in more than one quarter during the year.
This study tests the prediction that managers are more likely to record reversals of restructuring charges when earnings would otherwise fall short of an earnings target:
Hypothesis 1a: Ceteris paribus, reversals will occur more frequently in quarters in which pre-reversal earnings are below analysts' earnings forecasts.
Hypothesis 1b: Ceteris paribus, reversals will occur more frequently in quarters in which pre-reversal earnings are below actual earnings reported in the same quarter of the prior year.
Hypothesis 1c: Ceteris paribus, reversals will occur more frequently in quarters in which the firm experiences a pre-reversal net loss.
In addition, I expect the magnitude of the reversal to increase proportional to the amount of the shortfall in pre-reversal earnings:
Hypothesis 2a: Ceteris paribus, the greater the pre-reversal earnings shortfall relative to analysts' earnings forecasts, the greater the amount of the reversal.
Hypothesis 2b: Ceteris paribus, the greater the pre-reversal earnings shortfall relative to earnings in the same quarter of the prior year, the greater the amount of the reversal.
Hypothesis 2c: Ceteris paribus, the greater the pre-reversal net loss, the greater the amount of the reversal.
Political Cost and Contract-Based Incentives
Political costs and debt and compensation contracts based on accounting numbers also provide incentives for earnings management (see Watts and Zimmerman 1986, 1990 ). The political cost argument suggests that politically visible firms use accounting discretion to decrease reported earnings to avoid wealth outflows arising from allegations of excessive profitability. Because the firms in this study make income-increasing accounting adjustments, political costs cannot explain these reversals.
Contracts based on accounting numbers can provide managers with incentives to manage earnings. First, firms have incentives to avoid violating restrictive debt covenants (i.e., technical default).
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As the firm nears debt covenant constraints, managers likely use accounting discretion to create debt covenant slack (Daley and Vigeland 1983; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994; Sweeney 1994; Dichev and Skinner 2001) . Second, compensation contracts can provide managers with incentives to manage earnings. For example, Gaver and Gaver (1998) find some evidence that nonrecurring income-increasing transactions are associated with higher managerial compensation.
Sensitivity analyses reported later suggest that the study's inferences continue to hold after controlling for debt contracting and executive bonus-based incentives for earnings management.
IV. Research Design Sample Selection
I used the "Company/Allnews" files in the Lexis/Nexis database to identify firms that recorded reversals and the amounts of the reversals. firm-quarters that could not have had reversals because the quarters preceded the restructuring charges. I also excluded firm-quarter observations if earnings were so far below the benchmarks that reversals would likely be insufficient to raise earnings to meet the benchmarks. As a result, I excluded six non-reversal firm-quarter observations from the analyst forecast analysis because EPS was more than $5 below analyst's forecasts, and I excluded ten non-reversal quarters from the prior-year earnings and loss benchmark analyses because earnings were more than $5 below prior-year EPS or the firm reported a loss per share of more than $5. Table 1 If the magnitude of the restructuring charge reversal is increasing in the amount of the earnings shortfall relative to a specific earnings benchmark, then β 1 should be significantly positive. Table 3 reports descriptive statistics associated with earnings and earnings benchmarks.
V. RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
Median pre-reversal EPS (per Compustat) were $0.06 and $0.12 for reversal and non-reversal quarters, respectively. This evidence is consistent with lower pre-reversal earnings in reversal quarters (p<0.02, one-tailed test). There is no significant difference in analysts' forecasts in reversal and non-reversal quarters. This suggests that earnings are lower in reversal quarters than in non-reversal quarters relative to analysts' expectations. Specifically, the median prereversal EPS was $0.02 less than analysts' forecasts in reversal quarters, but median EPS was equal to analysts' forecasts in non-reversal quarters. This difference is significant at p<0.01
(one-tailed), and suggests that firms use reversals to increase earnings that would otherwise fall below analysts' forecasts.
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Median pre-reversal EPS is $0.02 less than median same-quarter-of-the-prior-year EPS in reversal quarters, and equal to same-quarter-of-the-prior-year EPS in nonreversal quarters, but this difference is only marginally significant (p=0.08 one-tailed test).
[INSERT short of analysts' forecasts, the reversal was large enough to increase earnings to equal or exceed analysts' forecasts. As a result, shortfalls are observed in 36.1 percent of reversal quarters, which is not significantly different from the shortfalls in 37.8 percent of non-reversal quarters.
Panel B of Table 4 shows that pre-reversal earnings declines relative to the same quarter 
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In sum, the evidence presented in Table 4 The results from the OLS regression analysis of the magnitude of the restructuring charge reversal on the magnitude of pre-reversal shortfall from earnings benchmarks appear in Table 5 .
The significant positive analysts' forecast error coefficient (column 1) (p=0.0008, one-tailed test)
suggests that the amount of restructuring charge reversals that managers record increases with the magnitude of the pre-reversal earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts. This evidence supports Hypothesis 2a. However, the magnitude of the earnings shortfall explains only a small proportion of the cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of the reversals.
The coefficient estimate associated with the amount by which prior-year earnings exceed pre-reversal earnings (column 2) is not significant. This evidence does not support Hypothesis 2b. However, the pre-reversal net loss coefficient (column 3) is significantly positive (p<0.03, one-tailed test). This suggests that, on average, the larger the pre-reversal net loss, the larger the reversal, supporting Hypothesis 2c. Again however, the overall explanatory power of the magnitude of the loss is low.
The results in Tables 4 and 5 
Sensitivity Analyses
The regression inferences reported above hold after including a proxy for debt contracting incentives -the difference between the sample firm's debt-to-assets ratio and the weighted-average debt-to-assets ratio in the sample firm's (4-digit SIC code) industry.
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I found this factor to be insignificant and including it in the analysis did not affect the study's inferences.
The primary analyses exclude firm-quarter observations that were at least $5 below the benchmark, because a reversal would likely not be sufficient to cover this shortfall. Similar inferences arose after winsorizing these observations to $5 shortfalls, using $2 or $1 shortfall thresholds, and without omitting these extreme observations. Regressions based on the ranks of dependent and independent variables also yielded similar inferences and overall explanatory power.
The models reported above use values scaled by the number of shares. As a sensitivity check, I estimated the models using total sales as an alternative scalar and using unscaled values.
I also estimated models controlling for firm effects and time effects. Each of these analyses yield inferences consistent with those drawn above. The regression inferences also hold after I include shortfalls from all three benchmarks as separate independent variables in the same regression. Specifically, the coefficients on the pre-reversal shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts, and on the amount of the loss are significantly positive (p<0.03), but the coefficient on the shortfall relative to same-quarter-of-the-prior-year earnings is not significant.
VI. SUMMARY
Managers have incentives to use accounting discretion to manage earnings to meet or beat several targets, including analysts' forecasts, prior earnings levels, and avoiding losses. One source of accounting discretion available to managers is the accounting estimates associated with the financial reporting of restructuring activities. Regulators have expressed concern that firms use restructuring charge accruals to manage earnings. During the 1990s, increasing numbers of firms reversed portions of earlier restructuring charges.
In this study, I find evidence consistent with managers using restructuring charge reversals to manage earnings. Managers are more likely to record reversals when pre-reversal earnings are below analysts' forecasts or when the firm experiences a pre-reversal loss, and they are marginally more likely to record reversals in quarters when pre-reversal earnings are below prior-year levels. The amount of reversals increases with the amount by which earnings fall short of analysts' forecasts and the amount of pre-reversal net losses, although these shortfalls explain only a modest portion of the cross-sectional variation in the magnitude of restructuring charge reversals. Consistent with regulators' and analysts' concerns, these findings suggest that firms, in some instances, use restructuring charge reversals to manage earnings to meet or beat earnings benchmarks. Moreover, the increasing incidence of restructuring charge reversals, and the evidence that managers are more likely to record reversals when pre-reversal earnings miss benchmarks, suggest that initial restructuring charges may include some hidden reserves.
The study is limited in that it examines only those reversals that firms disclose. Firms likely record but do not separately disclose smaller magnitude reversals. Also, the modest explanatory power of the models of the magnitude of the reversals suggests that management 20 toward these earnings targets is just one of many possible reasons for reversals. Future research into the role of contracting incentives on the reversal amount could provide additional information about the timing and amount of restructuring charge reversals. a I excluded firm-quarter observations from the analysts' forecast analysis if analysts' forecasts or earnings per share data were missing from I/B/E/S. I excluded firm-quarter observations from the prior-year earnings analysis if net income in the current quarter or four quarters prior was missing from Compustat. I excluded firm-quarter observations from the loss avoidance analysis if net income in the current quarter was missing from Compustat.
b I excluded six firm-quarter observations from the analysts' forecast benchmark analysis because EPS was more than $5 below analysts' forecasts and I excluded ten firm-quarter observations from the prior-year earnings and loss benchmark analyses because EPS was more than $5 below prior-year EPS or because EPS was a loss per share of more than $5. Variable Definitions and Notes: All amounts are adjusted to year-2000 dollars to control for inflation. Adjustment factors are based on the consumer price index. REVPS (reversal amount per share) = The amount of the reversal firm i recorded in quarter j, divided by the number of common shares outstanding at the end of quarter j. SHORTFALLAF (earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts) = The last median consensus I/B/E/S analysts' EPS forecast for firm i in quarter j minus pre-reversal actual EPS. I define pre-reversal actual earnings as (post-reversal actual earnings reported by I/B/E/S -reversal net of 40 percent tax). If the analyst forecast exceeds pre-reversal EPS, SHORTFALLAF is positive. DECLINE (earnings decline from prior-year earnings) = Actual EPS for firm i in quarter j of the prior year (excluding restructuring charges if any) minus actual pre-reversal EPS for firm i in quarter j. If the prior-year earnings exceed the current year pre-reversal earnings, DECLINE is positive. LOSSQTR (loss quarter) = 1 if firm i has a pre-reversal net loss in quarter j and zero otherwise. LOSSBR (loss per common share before reversal) = The absolute value of the actual pre-reversal loss per share for firm i in quarter j. a P-values for estimated regression coefficients are based on t-statistics determined using heteroskedasticity-consistent standard error estimates (White 1980) . 6 The Company/Allnews file contains press releases issued by publicly traded firms. The search term was "restruct! and revers!".
7 Inflation adjustments are based on the ratio of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the year to which the data pertain and the CPI in the year 2000. 8 To conduct the analysts' forecast tests, I used I/B/E/S actual and forecasted earnings to align the definition of the reported earnings measure and the forecast, as Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) suggest. In some instances, I/B/E/S excludes unusual items from reported earnings (e.g., nonrecurring gains and losses). Abarbanell and Lehavy (2000) discuss this practice. I examined I/B/E/S actual EPS for each reversal firm-quarter to determine if the restructuring charge reversal was excluded. If it was excluded, I added the reversal back to I/B/E/S EPS before performing the empirical tests.
9 When a firm recorded a restructuring charge in the same quarter of the prior year, I compared the current quarter pre-reversal EPS to the pre-restructuring charge EPS in the prior-year quarter. The inferences are unchanged when I omit these observations.
